Many Florida communities had to clear more post-storm debris than typically collected in an entire year, but Mother Nature’s wrath had just that and more in mind.

By Jonathan Burgiel and Chuck McLendon

Prior to the disastrous hurricane season of 2004 when four storms (Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne) impacted the state, many Florida communities knew about but discounted the risks of a catastrophic storm hitting the state—let alone their community. No major hurricane had hit Florida since Andrew made landfall south of Miami some 13 years earlier. In central Florida, it had been more than four decades since Hurricane Donna had struck. Spared a direct hit by prior recent storms, no one could have foreseen the onslaught of hurricanes that would ravage the peninsula in the ensuing months.

To date, more than 53 million cubic yards of debris have been cleared and nearly $4.4 billion in disaster recovery assistance have been appropriated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Indeed, these storms have had a lasting effect on the Sunshine State.

Table from FEMA
In retrospect, there are many lessons that can be gained from the 2004 hurricanes. Whether it’s hurricanes, tornadoes, ice storms, mudslides, or forest fires, all communities have unforeseen natural disaster risks that can benefit from Florida’s experience.

Prepared Versus Unprepared
It was evident from the response by communities across the state that some had done effective upfront preparation. These communities had workable disaster recovery plans that could be easily mobilized. Understanding that hurricanes are a known weather risk for Florida, proactive communities like Lake County (near Orlando) had update-to-date Disaster Response Plans and pre-positioned disaster debris hauling contracts so they could “hit the ground running” immediately after the storms.

Other communities found that, when the storms hit, their disaster recovery plans were insufficient. Some plans identified parks as potential debris staging areas but did not take into account situations such as traffic, and proximity to schools and residential neighborhoods.

Many communities also found another critical shortfall in the pre-event planning process was poor multijurisdictional coordination. Generally, coordination with the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), which is responsible for all state and federal highways across the state, was woefully inadequate. In the Panhandle’s Escambia County (which includes Pensacola), the FDOT had retained its own disaster debris contractor. Keeping the county’s contractor on county roads and the FDOT contractor on its assigned state/federal roads proved to be a huge task. Debris contractors are paid by the cubic yard collected, so debris equals money. When an FDOT contractor was found to be either intentionally or unintentionally collecting debris on a county road (or vice versa), the situation became volatile in some cases.

Having multiple contractors in the same area also proved to be challenging from a customer service standpoint. Escambia County received calls requesting debris collection service from residents living on roads that the FDOT was responsible for clearing.

In retrospect, having a cooperative agreement with the FDOT, whereby a single debris contactor is assigned to collect all debris within a designated zone containing county, state, and federal roads would have been preferable over the use of multiple haulers. Paying close attention that the proper loading location is recorded on each load ticket also makes back-end accounting regarding who pays (the county versus the FDOT versus the city) substantially easier.

Escambia County also found that a tremendous amount of coordination needed to occur with the two incorporated cities in the county as well as with the school board and regional utility authority.

Add to this special procedures and accounting for stump, hanging limbs, and dangerous leaning tree removal; waterway cleanup; initial 72-hour push; and private right-of-entry release forms, and you have the making of a never-ending maze of complexities that no one would have imagined unless proper planning had taken place well in advance.

It was clear that pre-event planning, like an insurance policy, paid out multiple-fold for communities that were ready to deal with the literal mountains of debris collected over the ensuing months.

Making the Grade
Many times, the benefits of communities being prepared versus unprepared materializes during the critical time period immediately following a natural disaster, what’s known as the “push period”—the first 72 hours after the disaster when heavy equipment is used to clear roadways for emergency vehicles. Literally, at this point, a good plan can mean the difference between life and death, and create a positive or negative public image of how the local government performed while “under fire.”

In Florida, typically, solid waste management or public works/roads departments took the lead on responding to debris removal throughout the state. Those that received the highest marks from their customers had the necessary equipment and personnel ready to mobilize and get the debris cleared while others were stumbling—sometimes taking days or up to a week to get a response team on the ground and mobilized.

With the significant volume of debris generated, debris hauling crews and equipment were in short supply. In many cases, makeshift plywood trailers were used to haul away debris. Often, this patchwork of vehicles was ill-prepared to handle the heavy limbs and debris generated by the storms. Again, communities with a plan and pre-approved contracts were the first to receive assistance from trained crews and appropriate equipment.

Markets, Markets, Markets
Once the debris was removed from the streets, the next phase of the cleanup effort began—processing and getting rid of the millions of cubic yards of mulch and construction-and-demolition (C&D) debris. According to the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), the volume of debris resulting from the four hurricanes would fill Florida State University’s Doak Campbell Stadium (an 80,000-seat football stadium) in Tallahassee, to the brim more than 90 times.

While under normal circumstances materials generated as a result of a storm may have some minimal value, the massive oversupply of mulch and C&D debris crippled the already shaky economics for recycling these material streams. Stockpiling the processed mulch was generally not an option due to the need to restore parks for spring sports leagues as well as concerns about spontaneous combustion of mulch piles. The pie chart provides an aggregate summary of the mulch markets for five communities representing approximately 20% of the state’s total debris volume.

As shown, the vast majority of mulch from these five case study communities was either landfilled, utilized for daily landfill cover, or used as fuel in domestic or foreign biomass plants. Huge quantities of mulch were trucked to major ports (including the Port of Mobile, AL, and Port Canaveral, FL) where the feedstock was loaded onto massive freighters. This material was ultimately used as fuel for biomass plants in Italy. Domestic fuel markets included the Okeelanta Cogeneration Plant, the Ridge Generating Station, and the Telogia Power facility—all in Florida.

Interestingly, only a very small fraction of the debris generated in these five communities was burned. Many communities attempted trial burns using air curtain incinerators, but most were ultimately shut down due to residents’ complaints about smoke and embers. Approximately 4% of the mulch was utilized for groundcover for nurseries and for pathways at flea markets, such as the one at the Central Florida Fairgrounds in Orlando. A company that took some of the material from Lake County plans to utilize the mulch in a compost product.

Reimbursement Issues
Reimbursement from FEMA is an important and sometimes long, drawn-out process that needs to be taken into account both in pre-planning activities and throughout the duration of the disaster recovery effort. As many in Florida have found, this aspect of the project will continue to be a focus of the recovery effort long after the cleanup has been completed.

There are many specific regulations and requirements that FEMA has imposed in the last few years. If these rules and regulations are not closely followed, communities may not be reimbursed for the costs they have paid out to their disaster debris contractors. One critical process that FEMA requires is collection and disposal monitoring. This process requires that trucks be certified prior to initiating collection activities to determine their volumetric capacity. Once certified, monitors are assigned to follow collection vehicles and issue tickets testifying that only storm-generated debris (as opposed to land clearing debris, etc.) from a designated zone was collected. Once at the debris staging area, visual estimates of truck fullness are made by disposal monitors stationed in towers prior to the truck unloading.

Until four or five years ago, no formal monitoring of debris haulers was required by FEMA. However, due to high levels of fraud by a few unscrupulous debris hauling firms, FEMA has since instituted the requirement for monitors to follow and record all debris loads hauled. As part of R.W. Beck’s role in the recovery effort, more than 500 staff members assisted in this monitoring and data gathering effort in Florida. Knowing these types of monitoring requirements and incorporating them into a community’s disaster recovery plan can be invaluable because this data often serves as a community’s cornerstone for FEMA reimbursement.

Summary
In summary, while natural disasters pose unknown risks, community managers in charge of disaster response need to be proactive. Development of pre-event disaster response plans and contracts was the best investment that many Florida communities have ever made. Many others that did not prepare in advance are now hurriedly preparing requests for proposals for disaster preparedness assistance and to select pre-positioned haulers for the future storm seasons. The unknown risks won’t change, but plans for dealing with them definitely can.

Jonathan Burgiel and Chuck McLendon are principals with R. W. Beck, a national solid waste consulting and engineering firm. They can be reached at jburgiel@rwbeck.com and cmclendon@rwbeck.com or 407-422-4911.

MSW - September/October 2005